2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ8 Kazak RQ2

death, according to my informants, a brother or a son might succeed or the heritage be divided among several sons. This made for smaller and smaller subdivisions until they were presently welded again into one when a particular ruler gained supremacy over the others. The death of a khan was normally followed by a civil war, with the local leaders taking sides with one or the other claimant or cautiously remaining neutral until it became clear which was likely to emerge victorious.

There are references[34] to meetings or councils to settle questions of general policy for the khanate. Such gatherings, however, cannot be said to have been of a democratic nature; Levshin[35] describes them as composed of the chiefs, the great warriors, the rich and the elders, "avec des troupes de curieux." The right to participate in such councils was not clearly defined; those who considered themselves entitled to do so took part and their words bore weight according to their personal prestige. It does not appear that any decisions which might be arrived at were binding upon anyone. Grodekov[36] was told that the meetings "did not change their customs."

The loose nature of the bond between the khan and the local groups has been indicated above. It is very difficult to speak of centralized, or at least responsible, government during the greater part of Kazak history. The point which I wish to emphasize again, however, is the lack of correlation between the genealogical "tribal" groupings and the political unions. There is little evidence of any graded series of political subdivisions or hierarchy of officials. Reverting again to the diagram on page 20, the bij and aqsaqal of the Davlet group, for example, were not in any way subordinate to the bij and aqsaqal of the Esqoça group. The two groups were quite independent, united only in their common if tenuous allegiance to their particular khan. In any given case moreover such similarly related groups might be subject to two different khans.[37]

In practice, however, there were instances of something approaching a dependence of one local group upon another, when a new uru group was in the process of development. There were for example a few families from Davlet consisting of about thirty tents who formed a semi-detached unit by themselves. They had their own headman, also called aqsaqal, who regulated the affairs of his few families but was generally influenced and controlled by the bij and aqsaqal of Davlet. Such a situation could doubtless be duplicated frequently. All groups were of course not of the same size and the smaller and weaker sought protection from the stronger. As the smaller groups increased in size they became independent equals of the established units.

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question which of the Chingisids in one case or another had the best right to the throne, and whether the election of this or that khan was legally valid."

[34] Grodekov, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 25; Levshin, *Description des hordes*, 397; Pallas, *Voyages*, 1: 621–22.

[35] *Description des hordes*, 397.

[36] *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 25.

[37] Here I am giving my own inferences from the general character of the information. The informants agreed that the above statement was true in principle but could furnish no concrete illustration. Kargabaev was very uncertain about the larger political affiliations of his own group.

[138 cont.]
175 Naimans, Konrads, Djalairs, and Kankly mingled with the
[631 Kazaks, and their names are preserved in the descent lines,
727] tribes, and most powerful sections of the Kazak hordes.

After joining the Kazaks, some peoples, such as the Durmans, Karluks, etc., parted from them once again to rejoin the Uzbeks. But the Kazaks were reinforced from another side by various Turkic tribes [races] who joined them at the time Tashkent was taken by Shabakht Khan and after the complete destruction of the Mogul Ulus, overthrown by Khan Abdulla.

[469] We should speak here of the descendants of Khan Arslan and of the destiny of the Kazak peoples under their dominion, as well as of the successive revolutions to which they were exposed and the quick overthrow of the power which they had acquired under Arslan. Instead of this, we will content ourselves
[114] with saying that the Kirghiz-Kazak led a nomadic life, had no chronicles nor any other historical monument of this nature, and, consequently, it is impossible to write a complete and coherent history about them.

Nevertheless this people did not remain entirely unknown to us after Arslan Khan. After having lost the thread of events described by the Oriental historians, we begin to find the Kazaks again, or, as they are called [139] today, the Kirghiz-Kazaks, in the works of European travelers and in Russian chronicles; and independently of the evidence which they furnish us, we have the archives to guide us, which preserve unimpeachable testimony of Russia's specific relations with different peoples of Asia.

Herberstein is the first of the European historians (1) to

1. Herberstein arrived in Moscow for the first time in 1517 and for the second time in 1526. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. VII, notes 165 ff.

speak of the Kazak horde. Having twice been ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor to Tsar Ivan Vasilievich, and having

[148 cont.]

175 643 were contemporaries of the Kungtaidji Bagatyre. A second proof can be added to this first one, namely, that in our table, as well as in the history, the son of Ishim is named Djangir.

In this way we find that Djadek, father of Shigai and grandfather of Ishim, lived with his brother Usiak toward the middle of the 16th century, that is, at the same time as the khan of Siberia, Kuchum, and his father, Murtaza. However, we do not know whether they were related nor whether they came from the same branch.

[14] Our knowledge does not go beyond Djadek and Usiak. In the middle of the last [18th] century, Tevkelev could not know the name of their father, because of the lapse of time since he had lived, and consequently it is still less possible to know it today.

175 643 554 From the questions we posed on this subject to Kazaks in the years 1820, 1821, and 1822, we learned only that their khans and sultans consider themselves the descendants of Chingis Khan. Most of the princes of upper Asia accord themselves this honor, and it is rarely without grounds. It is possible that many of the Kazak chiefs have a right to it, like many other Chingisids who received no other heritage from their strong and terrible ancestor but his name.

Abulgazi Baiadur proves that Kuchum, khan of Siberia, was descended from Sheibani, the grandson of Chingis, but Kuchum is known to have been a Kazak sultan, and therefore it is not surprising that other Kazak khans and sultans are also descended from Sheibani. Following [149] this first manuscript chart, if we go down from Ishim and Djangir, whose existence is known to us, to times closer to our own, we see that after Djangir comes his son, Khan Tiavka.

175 643 728 669 On hearing the name of this prince, the heart of every Kazak capable, through intelligence, of rising above his turbulent compatriots is filled with gratitude and veneration. He is the Lycurgus and Draco of the Kazak hordes. Once more he brought peace among them after the bloody dissensions. He stopped the

[149 cont.]

175 643 728 669 bloodshed caused for several years by the quarrels of certain tribes among themselves. He compelled everyone to obey him by his wisdom and equity. He caused the weak tribes to reunite in order to resist the strong ones, and forced the latter to be peaceful. He gave them all the laws by which he judged them, and their memory is still preserved among the wisest Kazaks, but unfortunately they are not carried out (1).

1. See the article on the form of government in the statistical section /of this book/. [Not translated.]

175 643 In spite of all his services and his influence among the hordes, Tiavka apparently did not enjoy wide power over his people, and used prudence, experience, his connections, and his cleverness more than force. As leader of all the Kazaks, he lived in Turkestan, as did his father and grandfather. He chose three chiefs, whom he held dependent upon himself, to govern and watch over each particular horde. These were: Tiul, in the Great Horde, Kazbek in the Middle Horde, and Aitiak in the Little Horde.

175 631 173 We speak here of the division of the Kazak people into three hordes, without having said when and how this took place. Unfortunately, this event is a mystery to us, and we have no way of determining anything in this regard. We do not know how much to believe of a folk tradition which says that a powerful Kazak khan divided all his people among his three sons, and that those [150] given the eldest son were called the Great Horde, those to the second, the Middle Horde, and those to the youngest son, the Little Horde (1).

1. The Kazaks translate the word "horde" by iuz, which means "hundred" or "century." This is why they say ulu-iuz ("the great hundred"), urta-iuz ("the middle hundred"). However the word iuz also has other meanings in Turkic.

[171 cont.]

only slavery and oppression in this submission, not the tranquility and peace which would be its fruit, and they forcibly opposed the Kazaks who were partisans of Russia.

This opposition was not enough for them, and they attacked the Bashkirs living within Russia, but were driven back by force. Shortly afterward a second attack was prepared against the Bashkir settlements, and Khan Shemiaka, who had sworn loyalty to Russia, did not refuse to lead the campaign. However, this second attempt was just as unlucky for them as the first.

The unrest fomented by these displays of the partisans of liberty affected those Kazaks who had sworn the oath of loyalty. They became uncertain once more and began to disavow their oath, and Tevkelev's position again became very critical. At that time he began to dream of ways of returning to Russia, but they did not wish to allow him to leave. Yielding to circumstances and lucky to escape death, he had to be content with permission to send his suite back to Russia with reports on the state of matters entrusted to his charge. He himself remained with the horde under the protection of Abulkhair.

Thus it appeared that Tevkelev had been abandoned as a sacrifice to the semibarbarous Kazaks. The danger which menaced [[66]] him seemed to become even more imminent when he was forced to accompany Abulkhair when he went to camp at the mouth of the Syr [Darya]. But this journey, on the contrary, was the source of the very successes for which the government had hoped and which its representative among the hordes had striven to obtain.

Abulkhair's move to the Syr took his subjects further away from [172] those who stood for independence and from his personal enemies, and it brought them closer to the peaceful Karakalpak nation, which had long been oppressed from all sides. As soon as they perceived the power of Russia, they sought her protection through Tevkelev, acknowledged themselves as subjects of the empire, and took the oath of loyalty immediately. Abulkhair was the man who took the most active part in this event, for two reasons: first, to make his power and services more glorious in the eyes of Russia; and second, in order to use this example in

[181 cont.]
and left Petersburg on June 15, 1734.

The extent of the means afforded Kirilov, the indulgence and generosity with which the government gratified all his demands, the authority with which he was invested, the privileges granted to the city of Orenburg, which was planned to be built, and the zeal with which relations were opened with the new subjects at once, show the degree of importance attached by the cabinet in St. Petersburg to the submission of the Kazaks and the number of advantages it expected from this. Unfortunately most of the plans made on this basis were not realized, first because of the revolt of the Bashkirs, and then because of the premature death of Kirilov.

The new mission with which he had been charged during his trip from Petersburg to Ufa had the same fate. At this time troubles broke out among the Volga Kalmuks, and Kirilov was ordered to prepare the Kazaks to punish them if they did not resume their duties soon (1).

1. See the ukase of August 26, 1734 under the name of Kirilov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Instead of busying himself with all these political matters with the Kazaks, when Kirilov arrived at the border he had to devote his full attention to pacifying the revolt of the Bashkirs.

This people presented obstacles to the realization of all the new plans. From the time of their submission to Russia, the limits of the lands they occupied had not been fixed, and they had had complete liberty to extend their camping grounds on all sides and complete ease not only in crossing the Yaik /Ural/ River freely and [182] attacking the Kazaks, but also in using the first favorable opportunity to rise against Russia herself.

With the erection of cities on the Yaik and the setting of the border on this river, which left the Bashkirs surrounded by Russian colonies and Russian troops, they felt their danger. In order to impede the execution of these measures, they formed a plan to oppose Kirilov's passage to the mouth of the Ori, where he had been ordered to lay the foundations of the new city and fortress.

[182 cont.]

[148] This attempt was fruitless, however. Although some detachments did suffer from their attacks, Kirilov himself reached his goal, and on August 15, 1735, he laid the foundations of the new city on what is now the site of the fortress of Orsk.

As soon as the fortifications began to rise, and troops and artillery had been introduced, Sultan Niaz, kinsman of Abulkhair Khan, was sent to the horde with several elders to announce to the Khan that his request had been fulfilled, in other words, that Orenburg had been built on the site which he had chosen, and also to invite him to present himself with all the chiefs of the hordes in the spring of 1736 in the new city to confer with Kirilov. At this same time the merchants of Tashkent who had come into [139] Russia with goods were sent back. In order to induce them to come and trade in the new city, various assistance was given them and many gifts, and they were informed of the privileges accorded to Orenburg.

[149] Moreover the revolt of the Bashkirs far from being put down grew more and more violent, and constant attacks were made on the supplies of our armies. Count Rumiantsev, commander in chief of the armies and father of the famous Zadunaiskii (1),

1. This means "beyond the Danube" and was a nickname given the famous Rumiantsev after his Turkish campaign. Note of [French] translator.

was appointed to force them to submission. Meanwhile Kirilov, who was constantly occupied with him about Bashkir matters, had no time to make closer contacts with the Kazaks.

[183] These facts indicated to him that another fortified line from this river to Samara, independent of the line of fortresses on the Yaik, was indispensable in order to guarantee the safety of Russia's relations with her Yaik colonies. As soon as he saw a chance, Kirilov endeavored to establish both the one and the other. From his reports to the imperial cabinet (1)

1. See the report of October 27, 1736.

[185 cont.]

x 648 was never sent and still remains today in the archives of the Border Commission in Orenburg (1).

1. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1737.

x 648 669 The Bashkir revolt had still not been put down. Abulkhair was afraid to take any part in this revolt, and he himself suggested to Tatishchev that he help to subdue the rebels. The higher authority was informed of this proposal and gave permission for it to be accepted (2), authorizing the Khan to enter the land of the

2. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 22, 1738.

Bashkirs, provided however that in acting against the rebels he would leave in peace those who remained loyal and would defend their persons and properties if necessary. In defiance of this order, x 648 726 Abulkhair pillaged the lands of the Bashkirs for two consecutive months without distinguishing between rebels and loyal subjects, and the results proved that he had no other end in proposing his [667] services but to gorge himself and his Kazaks on booty. It is even asserted that he intended to make his son khan of the Bashkirs, x 648 726 727 and when he entered the lands of this people, he announced himself their protector and defender before the Russian government, but when he saw that his deceit was a failure he began the pillage. As a consequence it was commanded that he be made to depart from the lands of the Bashkirs as soon as possible. Tatishchev carried out this order with gentle means and without wrangling.

The son of Abulkhair Khan, Erali, remained in Orenburg as hostage, however.

While Abulkhair was carrying out his ravages against the Bashkirs, part of his horde, which was camping at the mouth of the Ural, renewed its attacks against the Kalmuks and took many Russians prisoners during one of the raids (3). Fearing the just

3. See the reports sent from Astrakhan,

[195 cont.]

[726] Border Commission the reports of the Tatar Zhanaiev, already mentioned, who himself was in Khiva during the siege.

[469] his generals as khan. But this new prince had few troops at his disposal, and the Khivans were not slow in getting rid of him.

Nurali, son of Abulkhair, was chosen to replace this chief, who had done nothing more than appear, but his reign was no longer than that of his predecessor. When he learned that Nadyr was angered at the revolt of the Khivans and was preparing an army to punish them, he hastened to leave Khiva and to rejoin his father within the pasture lands of the Kazak Little Horde.

[726] He had not yet found security, however. Galdan Tsyren had grown impatient with the raids the Kazaks made while he had been engaged in war with China, and having finished his most important affairs, he again sent two bodies of troops, one of which attacked the Little Horde and the other the Middle Horde. Abulkhair appealed at once to the Russian government, requesting help. In order to respond to the Khan's wishes, the Imperial Cabinet gave orders that in case of danger he should be allowed to enter the fortress of Orenburg with his family and servants.

This permission was a kindness to Abulkhair, but it did not protect him from the attacks which the Dzungars might make later. Since he lived most of the time in the midst of the steppes or near the Syr /Darya/, [196] it was not always easy for him to seek refuge in Orenburg, which was too far away; the Dzungars could always cut him off from it by occupying the northern part of the Kazak steppes. In the west the Dzungars would have been aided by the Kalmuks, who belonged to the same race. It was still more dangerous for Abul Mahmet and Ablai. In many localities their subjects were the closest neighbors of the Dzungars and often themselves lived as nomads closer to the lands of the latter than to Orenburg.

When the danger was proven by the abduction of Ablai, the

[228 cont.]

X648 became unnecessary (2) because by then the Dzungars, the most

2. Ukase of the Senate of October 24, 1756.

terrible enemies of the Kazaks, had been almost destroyed. These were those same Dzungars who, under the reign of their kungtaidjis, Batur and Galdan Tsyren, had not only been seen to spread terror through the weak principalities of Central Asia, but also to arouse justifiable alarm in the emperors of Russia and China.

With an astonishing speed this people passed from the zenith of its power to absolute ruin. In 1745 under the commands of Galdan Tsyren it was still able to cause an important revolution in all of Central Asia. Under Galdan's sons, whose genius did not approach that of their father, this people imperceptibly lost all its energy, but its neighbors continued to fear it. In 1756 it had already been vanquished and dispersed, and so many had been X648 annihilated that its lands became almost completely deserted.

578 669 The principal causes of the fall of the Dzungarian empire were, as is known, the discord which took place among its last chiefs and the civil wars provoked by Amursan's ambition, which caused the ruin of the entire nation. Having quarreled with Davatsi, who disputed his authority, in 1754 he acknowledged himself a subject of China and begged this empire for auxiliary troops against Davatsi. Emperor Ch'ien Lung received him most graciously and [229] gave him a large army, which was given secret orders to accompany him not to assure him supreme power but to overthrow the Dzungars, who had so often disquieted the Chinese government. The intentions of the Emperor were realized, and in 1756 the ravaged lands of Dzungaria were annexed to China (1).

1. See the extracts from the Chinese work entitled Hsi Yu Wen Chien, in /E.F./ Timkovskii's Journey to China [Puteshestvie v Kitai chrez Mongoliiu v 1820 i 21 gg. (Journey to China through Mongolia in 1820 and 1821)], Vol. I, p. 155.

[230 cont.]
x 648 of prince and a calendar [sic] in which the conditions were stated by which he was recognized as a vassal.

[726] While Ablai and the weak sultans of the Middle Horde, who were his partisans, ravaged Dzungaria with their subjects, the Little Horde was fighting its coreligionists, the Bashkirs. An [721] offense committed by the former produced such a hatred between the two peoples that it has not been entirely eliminated today. In order to describe this event better, we will present a picture of the condition of the Bashkir country at this time.

[669] This people, which had been under Russian domination since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, had often raised the standard of revolt and had been punished for so doing. The misfortunes which caused the revolt of 1735 had scarcely ended in 1742. In spite of the difficult circumstances of this land, which for those seven years had had to mourn the loss and the sufferings of many of its inhabitants, the survivors did not remain quiet for long. On May 18, 1755 they revolted once more. Mutiny broke loose at once and began with the massacre of all the Russians to be found in the country, not only on the same day but almost at the same hour. This revolt was incited by the letters of a [793 721] mullah named Batyr Shah, who reproached the Moslem faithful for obeying Christians and implored every believer in God and Mohammed to take arms, assuring them that those who died [775] in this holy dispute would receive the eternal rewards promised by the Koran. Similar letters were also sent to the Kazan Tatars [726] and the Kazak hordes. The latter took advantage of the occasion and began at once to make raids across the Russian borders under the pretext of supporting the Bashkirs.

The position of the Orenburg line then became extremely critical. It extended over a length of more than 1,000 versts; it was separated from the settlements in the interior and was surrounded by the Bashkirs in the north and [231] the Kazaks in the south. Most of the so-called fortresses and fortified posts had no fortifications at all. The garrisons were weak. In a word, at the slightest reverse all the residents along the border could perish, excepting those defending the fortress of Orenburg.

xK 648 [721 167] EK MO 648 [721 167]

[256 cont.]

The Kazaks alone could not seize the Kalmuks, and they did not need to. The aim of their cooperation was better accomplished by their endless and repeated attacks, their pillaging and the capture of a large number of prisoners. Sultan Aichuvak routed one section on the Sagiz. Nurali delivered a violent blow to another section toward the east, and he also carried off several victories over them near the Mugodzhar Hills and on the Ishim River. Ablai [257] fought them with constant success. In some regions he acted in accord with Sultan Abulfenz, and their united forces caused immense losses to the Kalmuks, especially through the number of prisoners they took.

Erali, sultan of the Great Horde and at the same time paladin of the court of Peking, invited Ablai to join him against the Kalmuks several times. The latter refused to aid him, but this did not stop him from carrying out the plan he had devised. Erali found other allies and caused the fugitives to undergo enormous losses in men, animals, and personal belongings. We saw the details of this event in the historical account of the Great Horde.

When they were finally free of the Kazaks, the Kalmuks fell into the hands of the Buruts, and the misfortunes which the latter inflicted upon them were much worse than those they had suffered previously, particularly with regard to losses in prisoners. The Buruts, who were as greedy as they were ferocious, pursued them all the way to the Chinese border, to the new line established on the lands of the Dzungars. Ubashi crossed this line, not as he had imagined when he left the Volga as an independent sovereign, but as a humble subject who wished to save his life. He brought to China less than half of the Kalmuks who left Russia with him, the rest having perished en route.

K 648 669 662 c 648 669 662

In 1773 and 1774 Pugachev's revolt caused violent agitation in the provinces in the southeast of Russia. The lands washed by the Ural River, almost from its source to its mouth, were most exposed to this, because the Yaik Cossacks were the first accomplices of the false Peter, and the Bashkirs were his first allies. The troops forming the border guard assembled in the principal forts to defend them against the rebels, and the borders remained

[257 cont.]
undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

At this same time an event took place in the interior of the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali, the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik [259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

[288 cont.]

X 648 [673] 1795, his partisans assembled by invitation near Orenburg, and on September 17 he was elected and proclaimed khan. They then swore on the Koran to live in peace with each other and not to disturb the Russian border.

X 648 681 Ishim's elevation did not diminish his attachment to the power which had given him a new title. After he became khan he did not cease to carry out the wishes of the Russian government as much as possible, against the wishes of his people, and this caused him to have many enemies. In order to avert the dangers which threatened him because of the severity with which he investigated the crimes as well the intrigues of Syrym and his followers, Empress Catherine decided to send him a detachment of troops to guard him and at the same time to help him carry out sentences against the offenders.

Y 648 645 It was also decided to establish a divan or council of the khan around him to support him in the administration of the Little Horde. The members of this divan, chosen by the people from among the most distinguished sultans and elders, were to carry out the wishes of the Khan, to help him, to represent him, and to [289] live with him in houses which were ordered to be built for them in the steppes in the territory of Taissugan.

X 648 [669] These plans could not be carried out because Syrym Batyr attacked Ishim in November, 1797 near the fortified post of Krasny Yar [Krasnoiar] and, after causing him to perish cruelly, pillaged all his belongings.

This crime of Syrym's exhausted the patience of the government, but how and where was he to be punished, much less brought into Russia? No doubt it was possible to send troops against him, but the difficulty of looking for him, the maintenance of the troops beyond the borders, the loss of men from hunger and thirst, even the destruction of Syrym's followers still did not assure the success of the pursuit they might undertake. Thus we should not be astonished that this famous brigand evaded punishment for all his attacks against Russia.

[726] However, all the Kazaks who followed his example and pillaged the borders at that time did not remain without punishment.

[290 cont.]
for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon became useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim. Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali, but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council, inspired much more confidence in the government and had much more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to promise various advantages. However, what followed did not justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader. The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde. The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples, which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased from one day to the n[illegible] and finally the dissensions spread everywhere.

These circumstances produced very important consequences. Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

[291 cont.]
descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he followed a different course. He lived near the border of the government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kalmyk AH5

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175 /145 cont./
648 but these attempts were unsuccessful.

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175 In the 1840's the Kirghiz /Kazak/ steppe recalled the
648 past for the last time. Kenesary-Kasimov, grandson of Ablai
669 Khan, eclipsing the glory of his highly popular grandfather in the folk legends, assembled several thousand horsemen from the ranks of the malcontents. /illustration appears here/ proclaimed himself the restorer of the former greatness of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ people, and attempted to arouse all the Kirghiz /Kazak/ people under his banner. An enormous block of the nomadic population remained indifferent to the appeal of Kenesary, however. Yet the bravery and audacity shown by his brother Naurzbai /or Naurzbay/ and the latter's comrades won the sympathy of the population, who constantly protected the people of Kenesary and saved them from the pursuing Russian detachments, even though they did not express their sympathies actively. Thanks to this, Kenesary held sway over the Kirghiz steppe for seven years, and his followers traversed all the area from Orenburg to Karkaraly /Karkaralinsk/ and from Petropavlovsk to Turkestan, destroying Kirghiz /Kazak/ nomad villages and Russian settlements and taking the people
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[533] prisoner. In 1847 Kenesary and Naurzbai were killed by the Kirghiz /Kazak/, and now all that remains of their unusual audacity and bravery is a song in the memory of the people.

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175 With this we will end the description of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ for the time being and return to the chronological order of historical events in the life of the region.

K.K. /146/ In the 16th century, as we have seen, a people
175 who were known to the Russians under the name of Kalmyk
101 appeared in the southern sector of the region, and they drove
648 the Kirghiz/Kazak/ to the northwest. The Kalmyk represented
619 an alliance, called Oirot, composed of several tribes (the Torgout, Khonz, Khoshout, and Dzungarians). In the beginning
KK of the 17th century internal rivalries and the struggle with the eastern Mongols split up the alliance and it fell apart. In 1628 the Torgout went west to the upper courses of the Tobol and Ural

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